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Don’t Blame the Euro: Historical
Reﬂections on the Roots of the
Eurozone Crisis
EMMANUEL MOURLON-DRUOL
The article argues that many of the issues that are causing trouble in the eurozone
today had long been debated, but not solved, prior to the beginning of the so-called
euro crisis. Three thematic examples are used to show this: the decade-long discussion
surrounding economic convergence and the question of a transfer union; the dispute
over the alleged use of ﬁnancial mechanisms as a substitute for addressing structural
economic weaknesses; and the development of European banking regulation and
supervision before the creation of the single currency. Finally, the article argues that
even though some of the features of today’s crises – in particular the debt and deﬁcit
issues – were outlined at the time of the euro’s introduction, some important recent
developments such as the various new operations undertaken by the European Central
Bank were not. This should command modesty and cautiousness in the analysis of the
evolution of the euro crisis.
‘[I am stunned] that some may believe that one can correct budgetary mecha-
nisms or wage mistakes by monetary mechanisms.’1 It is not Angela Merkel
who made this statement during one of the (many) European Council meetings
devoted to the euro crisis since 2009. The statement, moreover, was not about
Eurobonds. This remark is from Helmut Schmidt, West German chancellor
from 1974 to 1982. He was commenting on a discussion about the state of
monetary cooperation in Europe during a European Council meeting in
Luxembourg in April 1976. Schmidt, rather ironically, recently criticised what
he described as the current German ‘National Egoism’ in an interview in Der
Spiegel (2012). The German conception of economic and monetary policy has
not really changed over the past decades and has remained quite remarkably
consistent both across time and between Social Democratic and Christian
Democratic/Christian Social/Free Democratic Party governments.
For contemporary observers of the eurozone crisis and above all for inter-
national economic historians, the question ‘Have we been here before?’ is both
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intriguing and relevant – the latter because history may contain lessons for the
current crisis. The easy answer would of course be ‘no’: the euro has no per-
fect historical precedent, and any comparison with similar systems of the past
is doomed to end up in concluding that, after all, things are not fully compara-
ble (Nordvig 2012). The Latin Monetary Union or the gold standard were not,
properly speaking, equivalent to the euro, and the circumstances under which
they emerged and disintegrated were different. But some of the issues at stake
in today’s discussions nonetheless have antecedents. The underlying factors
and arguments about economic convergence in the European Union are
virtually the same today as they were 40 years ago. Anyone familiar with the
European Monetary System (EMS) negotiations would be struck by how
similar the arguments used then are with our current debates. Furthermore, it is
vexing for those with a longer-term view to see commentators marvelling at
the allegedly ground-breaking novelty of creating a banking union – the
foundations of which in fact were already discussed, to no avail, 50 years ago.
The current eurozone crisis therefore highlights long-term continuities in
the history of European monetary cooperation that predate the euro’s creation.
To be clear, this article does not argue that the two periods are fully compara-
ble: apart from anything else, capital mobility was not as high then as it is
today, and debt and deﬁcit levels had not reached levels as high as today’s. As
a consequence, many of the solutions being implemented or envisaged go fur-
ther than other similar ideas suggested in the past (Vallée 2014). That said,
many of the long-term issues that create challenges today were long debated,
but not solved, prior to the inception of the euro. This article uses three the-
matic examples that are central to the current travails of the eurozone in order
to illustrate this point: the issue of economic convergence in the EU in the
1970s; the discussions over the reform of the ‘snake’ in the mid-1970s, culmi-
nating in the negotiations over the creation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) of the EMS in 1978–79; and ﬁnally, the debate over the development
of European banking regulation and supervision in the 1960s and 1970s and
its non-discussion during the 1990s Maastricht Treaty negotiations. These three
examples underscore wider, perennial themes and challenges to EMU – such
as intergovernmental versus supranational solutions, creation of a substantial
and redistributive EU budget – that can shed light on our current predicament.
Economic Convergence and the Question of a Transfer Union
One of the underlying factors that contributes to the eurozone’s travails is the
lack of economic convergence among its members. This problem is far from
new, as it was a central argument of the opponents to the Maastricht Treaty.
But even before the discussions about the creation of the single currency, eco-
nomic convergence was a hotly debated topic in the European Union. Back in
the 1970s, when EU (then still European Economic Community, or EEC)
member states tried to keep their currencies orderly by ﬂoating into some sort
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of EEC mechanism – dubbed the ‘snake’ in the early 1970s, which then
became the EMS in 1979 – questions of economic convergence were central.
With regard to EU monetary cooperation, most of the long 1970s saw the
opposition of two camps, referred to as the ‘economists vs. monetarists’ debate
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 29–30; Eichengreen 2000). The economists
argued that economic convergence should precede monetary union. This line
of thought was also dubbed the ‘coronation theory’, in that monetary union
resembled the coronation of a king or a queen after a long period of prepara-
tion. The monetarists – not to be confused with Milton Friedman’s brand of
monetarism – held the opposite view: a monetary union would induce
economic convergence. The German and also the Dutch governments tended
to be economists while the French and Italian governments or the European
Commission tended to be monetarists – though admittedly the lines were often
blurred between the two strategies, as both sides had valuable ideas.
The debate between economists and monetarists went to the very heart of
the EEC/EU’s possible monetary uniﬁcation. When it put forward a plan in
1974 to further European monetary cooperation, the European Commission
thus explained that the proposal would ‘push countries in the direction of
greater convergence of economic policies than is being achieved, or is likely to
be achieved under the present system’.2 The European Commission articulated
its monetarist thinking even more clearly in its 1975 Report on European
Union – a report the Commission wrote at the request of EEC heads of
government to explore the ‘transformation of the whole complex of the rela-
tions of Member States into a European Union’. ‘The achievement in due
course of Monetary Union’, the Commission concluded, ‘is a precondition for
economic integration within the Union and its cohesion in the world at large’
(European Commission 1975: 16). Conversely, the German government main-
tained strong opposition against any move towards further monetary coopera-
tion so long as the EEC’s member states’ economies were so divergent. In
preparing an informal meeting between EEC heads of government that took
place in Paris on 14 September 1974, Helmut Schmidt noted:
the time has not yet come to return to the pursuit of economic and mone-
tary union: Extreme disequilibria in current balances of payments might
cause the Community to drift farther apart rather than grow closer
together. ... Under these circumstances, the only way to success is to
continue a European stability programme with a view to harmonising
national economic policies.3
Only two years later, during a European Council meeting in The Hague in
November 1976, Schmidt even stated that given the current economic dispari-
ties, an ‘Economic and Monetary Union … is only a dream of diplomats’.4
Whether a dream of diplomats or the engine of economic convergence,
EMU remained an important topic on the agenda and hence the issue of
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economic coordination with it. Yet in the 1970s, European policy-makers did
not talk of any ‘growth compact’ as they did in 2012 (European Council Con-
clusions 2012). During the EMS negotiations, the key expression was ‘transfer
of resources’. A report produced in 1977, the so-called MacDougall report on
the role of public ﬁnance in European economic integration, recommended a
considerable increase in the EEC budget, ‘from 0.7 to around 2–2.5%’, so as
to make it more redistributive (MacDougall 1977: 17). Its recommendations
were not followed. This theme of increased redistribution across EEC member
states was recycled at the time of the EMS negotiations in the so-called con-
current studies that ran in parallel to the technical discussions about the incep-
tion of the ERM. These studies focused on the possibility of creating some
sort of EEC-wide transfer of resources, from the richer states – chieﬂy Ger-
many – to the less developed member states – chieﬂy Ireland, Italy, and Britain
(Ludlow 1982; Mourlon-Druol 2012). The reasoning behind this request was
that weaker economies needed these resources in order to sustain their partici-
pation in a stricter exchange rate system. The Irish and Italian governments
wanted concrete transfers of resources (that is, other than mere loans). The glo-
bal amount of transfers, according to the Italian government, should reach 2
per cent of GDP in subsequent years. The German opposition to such transfers,
however, was total, and the French government indirectly backed the German
government, as France most likely would have been among the contributors.
Although he agreed that ‘concurrent studies’ could take place in parallel to the
negotiations over the ERM, Schmidt seemed able or willing to countenance
assistance only in the form of loans. And indeed the only agreement eventually
reached was on European Investment Bank (EIB) interest rate subsidies for
Ireland. This was quite far away from the MacDougall-inspired dreams of a
more substantial redistributive budget or even from the more modest Italian
and Irish proposals.5
This story should sound all too familiar to any observer of the current
developments in the eurozone. Announced with great fanfare, the 2012 Growth
Pact was in fact composed of very limited measures. Among the €120 billion
allocated to stimulate growth are, in fact, many elements that are not really
new: €55 billion comes from unallocated structural funds, €60 billion from
EIB loans resulting from a €10 billion capital increase of the EIB (European
Council Conclusions 2012). Perhaps even more striking is the contrast between
the initial dramatisation of the additional negotiations, focused on economic
convergence, and the eventual result.
Back in the late 1970s, the ‘concurrent studies’ threatened to endanger the
very inception of the EMS. Unable to reach an agreement on resource trans-
fers, the Irish and Italian governments were about to reject EMS membership.
‘We must prepare ourselves for failure’, Schmidt said gloomily during the
Brussels European Council of December 1978.6 In the end, the Irish and
Italian governments asked for a ‘pause for reﬂection’, allowing the creation of
the EMS, but with only six members (the British government had already
announced it opted out). Yet it only took a couple of weeks to secure the
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eventual Irish and Italian agreements to participate in the EMS (Mourlon-Druol
2012: 255–7). The Irish government obtained extra loans and interest rate
subsidies, though, importantly, it did so through bilateral agreements rather
than through an EEC-wide scheme. Meanwhile, the Italian prime minister,
Giulio Andreotti, undertook extensive domestic political consultations in order
to convince his majority to support EMS membership.
This description ﬁts well with what happened in 2012. During his electoral
campaign and right after his election, François Hollande promised that he
would ‘renegotiate’ the Fiscal Compact of December 2011, the terms of which
had been discussed by his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy, in order to include
measures to support growth. He argued that balanced budgets and austerity
could not be the only goals and that it was also necessary to encourage
growth. Yet a proper renegotiation would have put at risk the existence of the
treaty itself – not to mention the fact that some EU member states had already
ratiﬁed this agreement. But almost as quickly as the Irish and Italian requests
had faded away in 1978, Hollande in 2012 abandoned any ambition of actually
renegotiating the ﬁscal compact. Instead, European leaders agreed upon the
‘Growth Pact’ outlined above, much more limited in scope,7 and the French
National Assembly eventually ratiﬁed the treaty in spite of some domestic
political difﬁculties. In 2012, as in 1978, no drama developed.
What these similarities highlight is a constant difﬁculty in moving from
largely limited and intergovernmental solutions to more substantial solutions –
be they intergovernmental or supranational. Calls for a more signiﬁcant EU
budget are frequent but remain today at the level of rhetoric, and they face
much opposition. Herman Van Rompuy made the most recent call in his report
‘Towards Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, which is still under
consideration at the time of writing (Van Rompuy 2012). This parallel between
what happened in the 1970s and our current predicament is only further
reinforced by another notable similarity: that of the monetary and ﬁnancial
discussions, then and now.
Financial Mechanisms as a Substitute for Economic Weaknesses?
The discussions about the sovereign debt mutualisation recall some of the argu-
ments advanced during the negotiations over the creation of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism in 1979. In a nutshell, the idea behind what is often described under
the general catch-word of ‘Eurobond’ is to create a new type of bond in euros,
jointly issued by the eurozone members, thereby allowing those member states
currently paying high interest rates to borrow at a lower cost (Claessens et al.
2012; European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2011).
More speciﬁcally, the original Bruegel Blue-Red Bond proposal suggested mutu-
alising debt up to a speciﬁc threshold (so-called Blue Bonds, up to 60 per cent of
the debt of each member state). The remainder was to be ﬁnanced on a national
basis (so-called Red Bonds) in order to create market discipline and to avoid
moral hazard. One of the key arguments of the opponents to any mutualisation
1286 E. Mourlon-Druol
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 06
:45
 11
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
of debt at the supranational level, aside from its theoretical desirability, is that it
would do little to improve the ‘fundamentals’ – that is, the budgetary situation of
the eurozone members in trouble. The creation of Eurobonds might be a useful
measure in the long term, they argue – but only once the budgets had been put
back on a sound basis (Weidmann 2012).
Back in the 1970s, the debates revolved around a similar set of issues and
reasoning, albeit regarding a different ﬁnancial mechanism. One of the impor-
tant points of negotiations during the discussions over the creation of the EMS
was the institution of a so-called divergence indicator (Mourlon-Druol 2012:
229–42). The indicator would identify when a currency diverged from the
average ﬂuctuation, upwards or downwards, and therefore allow the tailoring
of speciﬁc economic and monetary measures that would bring the currency
back to the average. Among the monetary measures envisaged were automatic
intra-marginal interventions (that is, interventions before the margins of ﬂuctua-
tions are reached) that would immediately correct the difference and bring the
divergent currency back towards the average ﬂuctuation.
The German government strongly opposed this proposal in terms that are
virtually identical to those it uses against the Eurobonds today. No amount of
monetary trickery, Schmidt argued, would be able in itself to bridge the gap
between weak-currency countries and strong-currency countries. An Italian dip-
lomat even reported that the German chancellor described the whole idea of a
divergent indicator as ‘stupid and incomprehensible’.8 The adjective ‘stupid’
was an exaggeration, but the proposal was incomprehensible from a German
point of view: prior economic convergence was the key to any possible future
monetary convergence. If a divergence indicator were created, the divergence
indicated could only lead to consultations, not automatic intra-marginal inter-
ventions. Schmidt’s view prevailed, and the divergence indicator created in
1978 was deprived from the very beginning of any effectiveness.
The German position remained constant throughout the 1970s (de Saint
Périer 2006; Mourlon-Druol 2012; Thiemeyer 2004). When the French govern-
ment in 1974 suggested reforming the snake in order to render it more ﬂexible
(that is, with larger bands), thereby helping the weaker currency countries to
re-join it, the German government refused. The French proposal focused on
what would be at the centre of the EMS negotiations a few years later, namely,
the possibility of organising an exchange-rate system around a unit of account
(Mourlon-Druol 2009). The snake so far set its margins of ﬂuctuation by using
the maximum differential between two currencies, thus creating a bilateral grid
of parities. By contrast, the French proposal suggested setting the margin of
ﬂuctuation with reference to the value of the European Unit of Account
(EUA). The French government argued that this would share the burden of
adjustment more fairly, since that burden so far had fallen only on the weaker
currencies. It would also help to identify more easily the currency that would
diverge vis-à-vis the rest. The strongest opposition to such a proposal came
from the German government (but also, more generally, the snake members).
Technical problems concerning the feasibility of such a system aside, the
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German government insisted that key to convergence was economic adjust-
ment, not monetary technicalities. When the same proposal was revamped dur-
ing the EMS negotiations – though this time the exchange rate system was
meant to be organised around the European Currency Unit (ECU), not the
EUA – both the German economics and ﬁnance ministries stated: ‘a ﬁnancial
transfer to the economically weaker member states should not be provided
through monetary mechanisms’.9
In 1976, when the Dutch government set out a proposal aimed at creating
‘target zones’ for the ﬂuctuations of EEC currencies, again with the hope that
it would allow non-snake members to re-join the EEC mechanism, the German
government was once again opposed to the idea. Part of the Dutch proposal
was comparable to the EMS divergence indicator in that it considered that the
target zones would represent triggers for EEC member states to align their
monetary policy with one another. Indicating what would be his position dur-
ing the EMS negotiations, Schmidt expressed concern that this would merely
nurture the illusion that a monetary mechanism could help solve problems that
fundamentally lie with national economic policies. Only once national
economic policies were put back in order could any Europe-wide mechanisms
be envisaged.
This pattern of consistent opposition raises the question of why the German
government changed position in early 1978 and accepted the creation of the
EMS. Part of the answer lies in the fact that the EMS was not very different
from its predecessor, the snake. The ﬂuctuation margins were the same, with
one slight modiﬁcation: wider margins could temporarily be offered to those
currencies that were no longer members of the snake. Only Ireland and Italy
chose to beneﬁt from them. The credit support mechanisms (very short-term
ﬁnancing, short-term monetary support, and medium-term ﬁnancial assistance)
were, it is true, quite substantially increased. But the divergence indicator
involved no obligation to intervene; the ECU, introduced with great fanfare,
was in fact a mere rechristening of the EUA introduced in 1975; and the nego-
tiations over the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) had meanwhile
been postponed to a later date. The probability that these negotiations could
ever be concluded was quite low from the beginning given the strong opposi-
tion of the Bundesbank. Indeed, talks about an EMF had been set aside during
the EMS negotiations because of Bundesbank opposition.
Another part of the answer lies in the emergence of a new Europe-wide con-
sensus on the need to pursue stability-oriented economic policies (MacNamara
1998; Mourlon-Druol 2012). After the appointment of Raymond Barre as
French prime minister in August 1976, the French government started following
a clear anti-inﬂationary policy. This stance starkly contrasted with the stop-and-
go policies that had been followed up until then. Barre, a university professor
of economics and former vice president of the Commission in charge of the
economic and ﬁnancial affairs portfolio, was less sensitive to political pressures
than previously politicians had been. During the same period, the Italian
government adopted an anti-inﬂationary stance. In 1978 Filippo Pandolﬁ, the
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Italian ﬁnance minister, presented a plan tellingly entitled ‘A Programme for
Development, a Choice for Europe’. The economic policies of many EEC mem-
ber states therefore followed similar orientations and, importantly, orientations
that suited the German government.
Such an analysis could well apply, mutatis mutandis, to the German posi-
tion in the eurozone’s current predicament. Today, as throughout the history of
European monetary union, a central issue is the consistency of economic and
monetary policies. Mistaken or not, some policy-makers considered and still
believe that some monetary or ﬁnancial mechanisms devised in the wake of
crisis are just illusory medicine. Eurobonds today, like automatic intra-marginal
interventions for the divergence indicator in 1978 and failed plans for a reform
of the snake in the mid-1970s, can be interpreted as a way to avoid addressing
the ‘economic fundamentals’. The history of European integration suggests
that, should a solution to the present crisis emerge, it could well be much more
limited, in technical terms, than some could hope. Both the ERM created in
1978 and the ‘growth pact’ adopted in 2012 fell short of many actors’ hopes
and expectations. The dynamic is similar in the case of EU banking regulation
and supervision, as the next section will show.
The EU’s Capital Market and the EU’s Banking Regulation and
Supervision
The issue of EU banking regulation and supervision was already on the agenda
of European policy-makers in the 1960s. It was intensely discussed then and in
the early 1970s, with few concrete results. Even before the international bank-
ing crises of the mid-1970s that spurred the launch of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (Schenk 2014, forthcoming; Goodhart 2011), the then-
European Economic Community debated the question of setting up EEC-wide
banking regulation and supervision.
The Segré report, published in 1966, raised the issue of capital market inte-
gration in Europe (Segré 1966). Such a capital market was needed, the report
explained, in order to facilitate and improve the functioning of most of the
existing EEC policies as well as a future monetary union. The emergence of a
European capital market would inevitably raise the issue of regulation and
supervision, partly to avoid unfair competition between banks resulting from
regulatory differences from one member state to the other (Segré 1966:
Chapter 12). The logic was, and still is, quite straightforward: a single capital
market implies a single regulator and supervisor. As a consequence, the
European Commission started investigating the possibilities of coordinating
banking regulation and supervision across the EEC.10 One part of the question
was to suppress the obstacles to the freedom of establishment (to fulﬁl the
Treaty of Rome’s objectives) and another part was to regulate and harmonise
the rules governing these activities. In short: negative integration and positive
integration.
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In July 1972, Wilhelm Haferkamp, the European commissioner then in
charge of the discussions, wrote a draft directive on the coordination of legisla-
tive, regulatory, and administrative dispositions concerning access to the non-
stipendiary activities of credit institutions and their exercise (European
Commission 1972). There are noteworthy parallels between the Commission’s
plans of the 1960s and early 1970s and today’s discussions. In 2014, the
eurozone banking union is composed of three pillars: the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM), deposit insurance, and a resolution mechanism (Howarth
and Quaglia 2013; Quaglia 2010). Whereas the Commission never set out to
create a single supranational supervisor in the 1960s and 1970s, it did tackle
the issues of deposit insurance and a resolution mechanism (under the more
modest item of ‘winding up procedures’). In other words, the Commission
clearly articulated the link between the harmonisation of EEC banking regula-
tion and supervision, on the one hand, and the further development European
monetary cooperation, on the other.
The plans ran into member state opposition, and they raised particular con-
cerns for one applicant to EEC membership: Britain. Already in the early
drafts of the directives, an ofﬁcial at the Bank of England commented,
As it stands, there is virtually no article which we can readily accept in
its present form. The whole philosophy of the directive is, of course,
diametrically opposed to our system of informal supervision and it is dif-
ﬁcult to see how the present text can be amended to accommodate it.11
The Bank of England’s tradition of supervision largely rested on moral suasion
rather than the formal measures that the European Commission envisaged.
And, of course, London was by far the biggest European ﬁnancial centre and
one of the most important in the world (Bussière and Cassis 2005). Added to
this was a more general point, namely that ﬁnancial regulation and supervision
is a very sensitive national prerogative and hence difﬁcult to Europeanise,
let alone harmonise at an international level. As the chairman of the Basel
Committee, George Blunden, explained in 1977:
The banking system of a country is central to the management and efﬁ-
ciency of its economy; its supervision will inevitably be a jealously
guarded national prerogative. Its subordination to an international author-
ity is a highly unlikely development, which would require a degree of
political commitment which neither exists nor is conceivable in the fore-
seeable future. (Cited in Schenk 2011: 74)
The various texts advanced later were considerably watered down (British entry
into the EEC obviously increased British inﬂuence on the negotiations), removing
any immediate ambition at EEC-wide regulation and supervision to the directives
adopted in the 1970s (Council of Ministers 1973, 1977; Louis 1995; Penn 1989).
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More recently, the Maastricht Treaty negotiations sidestepped the issue of
EU banking regulation and supervision (James 2012: 292, 313–17). During the
drafting of the ECB’s statute, the Bundesbank opposed any language alluding
to an explicit role for the new central bank in supervising banks. The issue
therefore remained unresolved until the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis placed it back on
the agenda. Set up by the president of the European Commission, José Manuel
Barroso, a group chaired by Jacques de Larosière explored the future of EU
ﬁnancial regulation and supervision. It released its report in February 2009 (de
Larosière 2009). Two recommendations were central to the report: the
inception of a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), responsible for
‘macro-prudential supervision’, and the creation of a European System of
Financial Supervision (ESFS), responsible for ‘micro-prudential supervision’.
Some institutions have already been created in 2011 (a European Banking
Authority in particular), and the creation of a banking union for members of
the euro area is being set in motion at the time of writing.
Eurozone banking regulation and supervision, in its current form, suffers
from some weaknesses. The exclusion of London, the leading European ﬁnan-
cial centre and the single currency’s most important ﬁnancial market, which is
not member of the eurozone, remains a central issue, as it did in the 1960s and
1970s (Roberts 2005: 309). The question of which banks will be subject to EU
regulation and supervision is also problematic today, as it was in the 1960s
and 1970s. The fact that some banks, and especially the German savings
institutions, are excluded from the eurozone’s banking union framework could
further undermine the regulatory regime given their importance in the
European economy (Hüfner 2010). These two central challenges to any
European-wide banking regulation and supervision have therefore remained lar-
gely the same over the past 50 years, although current developments seem to
bring more substantial changes.
Conclusions: The Pitfalls of Predictive Explanations
The three case studies presented above – economic convergence, ﬁnancial
mechanisms, and moves towards a banking union – underscore that the current
travails of the eurozone highlight long-term issues that predate the euro’s crea-
tion and are not linked to the euro sensu stricto. The discussion of economic
convergence often centred on the role that an EU budget could and should
have; the introduction of monetary and ﬁnancial mechanisms depended on
whether northern states saw them as trickery designed to hide fundamental
economic differences, a lack of budgetary discipline, and reluctance to correct
either; and the difﬁculty of transferring highly sensitive responsibilities from
national authorities to the Europe-wide level hindered the development of EU-
wide banking regulation and supervision. Far from suddenly appearing with
the euro crisis, these three issues have been, with quite remarkable consistency,
on the agenda of EU policy-makers for the last half century. This does not
mean that the eurozone is doomed to repeat past mistakes. Rather, it means
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that the eurozone’s troubles reﬂect a longstanding series of concerns and
challenges that the euro’s successful ﬁrst few years allowed policy-makers to
forget.
A ﬁnal point concerns the difﬁculty of predicting the future evolution of
the complex systems that the EU and the eurozone entail. This can
superﬁcially appear as a banal point, but the young history of the euro has
underscored just how signiﬁcant this was. In 2000, Niall Ferguson and
Laurence J. Kotlikoff wrote a (partly) prescient article on the euro in Foreign
Affairs (Ferguson and Kotlikoff 2000: 121). Fiscal problems, they argued, were
such that the euro would sooner rather than later prove unsustainable. They
speciﬁcally highlighted the debt and deﬁcit problems in some eurozone mem-
bers. Although the eurozone’s current predicament suggests that they had a
point, the intervening years have also uncovered two problems in their reason-
ing. The ﬁrst concerns the possibility of leaving the eurozone: ‘history shows
there is always an exit’, wrote Ferguson and Kotlikoff. Our current predica-
ment certainly cannot exclude a future exit of a country from the eurozone, but
it has by the same measure shown that it was not so easy – and certainly not
as easy as Ferguson and Kotlikoff seemed to have assumed in 2000. As Barry
Eichengreen (2007, 2010) argues, a country could obviously try and leave the
euro area, but the technical and political difﬁculties would be immense. Look-
ing only at the technical difﬁculties, the ‘operational challenges’ linked with
reintroducing national currencies, the difﬁculties associated with the devising
of new national monetary policies in times of crisis, and the reprinting of
16 billion euro banknotes – to name but a few – would create ‘huge, possibly
insurmountable, operational challenges’ (Papadia 2014). The economic costs
(as debt would remain denominated in the euro in many cases) would also be
huge, and it is not obvious that the country would be better off in the long
run, and, indeed, it might well be worse off (Eichengreen 2007, 2010). These
important points highlight that leaving the euro does not have the same opera-
tional and economic implications as leaving the gold standard or the EMS.
Since the beginning of the euro crisis, no single member has left the eurozone
(rather the contrary, as two countries have joined: Estonia in 2011 and Latvia
in 2014), and no single member has been expelled. A voluntary and orderly
euro exit in 2014, although it cannot be excluded, appears less easy or less
advantageous than it did in 2000.
The second problem with the Ferguson/Kotiloff prediction lies in its static
vision of EU institutions and policies. Their article excludes the possibility that
the ECB could ever change its policy:
the Maastricht Treaty effectively rules out printing money; Article 104 of
the treaty ... and Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks enshrine a strict ‘no bail-out’ rule. Member states that
hope to inﬂate away their debts will simply be turned away. (Ferguson
and Kotlikoff 2000: 118)
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It is true that the ECB’s overriding objective is controlling inﬂation, and it
technically cannot bail out a state. The main operations it undertook since
2000, however, show that the ECB, as much as many other actors involved in
EU policy processes, can take unexpected and unpredicted policy measures. In
2000, it seemed inconceivable that the EU would adopt the series of measures
that have been implemented in response to the crisis. In 2010, the ECB estab-
lished a Securities Markets Programme (SMP), through which it can (to sim-
plify somewhat) buy eurozone member states’ bonds on the secondary market
(ECB 2010). Second, in December 2011, the ECB carried out so-called Long-
Term Reﬁnancing Operations (LTROs) to support bank lending and liquidity in
the eurozone (ECB 2011). Third, the ECB recently transformed the SMP into
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), whereby, under speciﬁc conditions, it
can buy eurozone members’ bonds on the secondary market with ‘no ex ante
quantitative limits’ (ECB 2012). Far from being static and stubbornly con-
cerned with anti-inﬂationary policy, incapable of devising any ‘creative’ mea-
sure in face of the urgency, the ECB has partly adapted itself to circumstances.
Rhetoric has also evolved. Mario Draghi, the ECB’s president, famously
declared that ‘within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to
preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough’ (Draghi 2012). One may
well argue that these reforms are wrong-headed, illegal, insufﬁcient, and/or too
late. The point stands, however, that such an evolution could hardly have been
anticipated 14 years ago. In these developments, and in the broader history of
European integration since the Second World War, lies perhaps a last lesson
history can offer: the value of expecting the unexpected.
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Notes
1. French National Archives (hereafter AN), site de Fontainebleau, 19900568, Article 400,
Ministère des Affaires étrangères, La cabinet du Ministre, Le Conseiller technique, Conseil
européen de Luxembourg, Compte-rendu résumé, 6 April 1976. This paper is based on a wide
selection of British, French, German, Irish and Italian government and central bank archives as
well as EU archives. English translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
2. European Commission Historical Archives (hereafter ECHA), BAC 565-1995 355, Commis-
sion of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Economic and Social Affairs, Note
on concerted ﬂoating, undated, presumably October 1974.
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3. Historical Archives of the European Union (hereafter HAEU), EN 599, Ausführungen des
Bundeskanzlers in Paris am 14 September 1974. See also AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAA009361, Unter
Verschluss, Betr.: Auswärtiger Ausschuss am 25. September, Dr. Massion, 24 September 1974.
4. AN, 5AG3/911, Note du Conseiller technique du Cabinet du Ministre du Ministère des
Affaires étrangères, Compte-rendu résumé du Conseil européen de La Haye, Verbatim résumé,
6 December 1976.
5. This debate also recalls the wider issue of introducing a gouvernement économique and the
later debates over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) up to the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance (TSCG) signed in 2011 (Verdun 2000).
6. National Archives of Ireland (hereafter NAI), Department of Foreign Affairs (thereafter DFA),
2008/79/1939, Notes of Michael O’Kennedy, European Council, Brussels, 4/5 December 1978.
7. This is also reminiscent of the story of the Stability and Growth Pact see (Heipertz and Verdun
2010).
8. The National Archives (hereafter TNA), FCO 30/4029, Telegram No. 504, German/Italian talks
in Siena on 1/2 November, EMS, 2 November 1978. This is somehow similar to what Angela
Merkel would have declared in 2012, namely that there would not be any Eurobonds ‘as long
as I live’ (‘Chancellor Merkel Vows No Euro Bonds as Long as She Lives’ 2012).
9. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), B126/70440, Willmann to Lahnstein, Europäisches
Währungssystem, 11 September 1978.
10. Bank of England Archive (hereafter BoE), 8A48/1, Commission of the European Communities,
Possibilities for the coordination of banking legislation in the member states, 5 June 1969.
11. BoE, 8A48/4, unsigned note, Draft Directive on the Harmonisation of Supervision over Credit
Institutions, 19 September 1972.
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